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Carlo Patent sat at the far end of a mahogany table and patiently
waited for the licensing negotiations to begin. The thumping was weak
at first, but now there was no denying its presence. Through the rattling
of his water cup and the sway of the lights above, Carlo felt as if the
whole foundation of his company was shaking in protest. Then, without
further warning, the door to the conference room burst open and a
hunched over Eli Widget hastily entered riding on top of his half-ton
pink elephant. Carlo ignored the elephant, introduced himself to Eli, and
began his presentation. Within seconds Carlo was cut off by Eli’s demand,
“Listen, do I infringe your patent or not?” “Well, sir,” replied Carlo, “that’s
what I am here to discuss and find out.” The elephant shifted uneasily and
slowly advanced towards Carlo. “I don’t think you answered my question.
Do I or do I not infringe your patent?” By now the elephant’s trunk was
inches from Carlo’s face and he could no longer maintain his carefree
composure. “Alright, yes, I think you may infringe my patent, but I
want to work out a licensing deal with you, or if it is possible, maybe
you could show me how your product does not infringe my patent.” But
it was too late. As Eli smugly turned and began his exit, he muttered
over his shoulder, “Thank you very much Carlo; we’ll see you in court.”
Three days later, Carlo was served with a lawsuit seeking to declare his
patent invalid, and to further declare that, even if the patent is valid, Eli
does not infringe.
This scene dramatizes the problem feared in boardrooms today: Even
a good faith attempt to negotiate a license could expose a patent holder
to a declaratory judgment challenge against the validity of the parent
holder’s patents. A declaratory judgment is a procedural device that
allows for a judicial determination of rights and legal relations between
two adverse parties.1 In the patent context, declaratory judgment jurisdiction
balances the interests of the patent holder and the potential patent infringer.
Too much declaratory judgment jurisdiction would allow a potential
patent infringer to challenge a patent holder’s patents for no legitimate
reason, unfairly subjecting the patent holder to excessive litigation.
However, too little jurisdiction would allow a patent holder to prey upon a
potential infringer’s uncertainty about whether or not the potential
infringer really does infringe a valid patent, and coerce outrageous licenses.
This Comment explores how the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,2 and the subsequent Federal Circuit’s decision in
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.,3 both contribute to an
overexpansion of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
1.
2.
3.
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The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 provides jurisdiction to
potential patent infringers who seek judicial resolution regarding the
question of whether or not they infringed a patent.4 The MedImmune
and SanDisk decisions unnecessarily expand this jurisdiction too far in
favor of the potential patent infringer.5 This overexpansion of
declaratory judgment jurisdiction threatens to chill licensing negotiations
and conflicts with the policy justifications rooted in the Declaratory
Judgment Act of 1934.
Part I of this Comment will analyze the background behind the creation
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, beginning with the Declaratory
Judgment Act of 1934.6 Part II will explain the significant relation
between declaratory judgments and patent infringement, focusing on the
recent development of the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions. Part III
will then explore three potentially negative implications of the Federal
Circuit’s SanDisk decision. Part IV argues that in light of recent cases,
the expansion of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in MedImmune and
SanDisk is not convincingly supported by the policy underlying patent
declaratory judgment law. As a result, Part V recommends a new
declaratory judgment jurisdiction test, to better balance the rights of
potential infringers and patent holders, by encouraging district court
judges to use discretion to decline declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
Prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, parties could not
secure the determination of legally enforceable rights against another
party without first having a valid cause of action under which to sue that
other party.7 This stranded potential patent infringers with no way to
definitively resolve their uncertainty about the validity and scope of
patents that questionably related to their business, until the patent holder

4. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
5. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
7. See Legislation Recommended by the American Bar Association: Hearing on
H.R. 5030, H.R. 10141, H.R. 10142, and H.R. 10143 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 16 (1922) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. Sumners) (noting that
the purpose of the declaratory judgment statute is “[t]o remove uncertainty” and that “the
individual citizen has as much right to be reasonably certain as to what the courts would
determine his rights to be as he has to be reasonably certain what the legislature has
determined his rights to be”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
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filed an infringement suit.8 Additionally, patentees would utilize the
potential patent infringer’s uncertainty to elicit unfair and advantageous
licensing agreements.9 In Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem,
Inc., the court described the situation the Declaratory Judgment Act
sought to resolve:
[A] patent owner engages in a danse macabre, brandishing a Damoclean threat
with a sheathed sword. . . . Guerilla-like, the patent owner attempts extrajudicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect
the competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty and
insecurity. . . . [C]ompetitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless
and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue.10

However, by enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended
for any party to have access to the courts to declare their rights and other
legal relations as long as an actual controversy existed between the
parties.11 Competitors were no longer restricted to an “in terrorem
choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the
air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.”12
The phrase actual controversy within the Declaratory Judgment Act
refers to the type of cases and controversies that are justiciable under
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.13 The Supreme Court has
8. Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 35
(1928) (statement of E.R. Sunderland, Professor). Professor Sunderland explains the
alleged patent infringer’s entangled situation as:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that you have a
patent. What am I going to do about it? There is no way I can litigate my
right, which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and
you [the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just
as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you may sue
me for damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good faith and
on my best judgment, but having no way in the world to find out whether I had
a right to use that device or not.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 734–35.
11. “In promulgating the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended to prevent
avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain of his rights and
threatened with damage by delayed adjudication.” Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton
Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed Cir. 1991). “In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
(2000).
12. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735.
13. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1. This Clause states:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
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interpreted an appropriate justiciable controversy as one distinguishable
from a hypothetical, abstract, academic, or moot dispute.14 For a court
to have jurisdiction over a controversy, “the controversy must be definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.”15
II. JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLD FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS IN PATENT ACTIONS
Courts have struggled to determine an appropriate standard for determining
when a controversy is sufficiently “definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of parties.”16 The Supreme Court has determined that the
Declaratory Judgment Act’s justiciability principles are the nature and
controversy of the case as determined through “the relation and interests
of the parties, and the relief sought in the instant case.”17 The Court
analyzes justiciability in this context by examining standing and ripeness.18
The plaintiff has standing if they are threatened with imminent injury-infact, fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.19
Ripeness requires the parties to suffer a sufficient hardship that can be
redressed through the court’s consideration.20 However, standing and
ripeness are amorphous concepts that defy bright-line applications, so
courts have struggled to define a consistent justiciability threshold for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.21 This is troublesome for both patent
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of
another State; between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.; MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937).
14. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240.
15. Id. at 240–41. See also Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 371 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240.
17. Id. at 241.
18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007).
19. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
20. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
21. “Previously, the Court held that ‘the difference between an abstract question
and a “controversy” contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of
degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for
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holders and potential patent infringers, because there is no easy definition of
safe licensing communication, free of the threat of declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.
Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit articulated a two-part “reasonable
apprehension of suit” test to determine when declaratory judgment
jurisdiction was proper in patent cases.22 First, the court considered
whether the patentee’s conduct created reasonable apprehension on the
part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff.23 Second, the court examined
whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s current or future conduct
would amount to infringing activity.24 Although the Federal Circuit’s
reasonable apprehension of suit test was used to guide parties as to the
Constitution’s Article III justiciability limit, the test was actually more
restrictive of declaratory judgment jurisdiction than the full extent
potentially allowable under the Constitution.25 By limiting declaratory
judgment jurisdiction to something less than the constitutional maximum,
the Federal Circuit was trying to protect “quiescent patent owners against
unwarranted litigation.”26 The policy behind this promoted negotiation over
litigation, and set a standard that patent holders could follow to prevent
litigation.27

determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.’” Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v.
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). See also Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the
Supreme Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for distinguishing those cases that
satisfy the actual controversy requirement from those that do not).
22. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
23. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
24. Id. (citing Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736). The court did not decide the merits of
whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s conduct infringes on the patent holder’s
patent. But if the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s activity does infringe the declaratory
judgment defendant’s patent, then the court will be more inclined to grant a declaratory
judgment. Conversely, if the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s action does not infringe
the defendant’s patent, then no controversy exists and the court will decline declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379.
25. In Teva Pharmaceuticals, Judge Gajarsa argued in his dissent:
[The court] claims that a reasonable apprehension of suit is required to meet
Article III’s case or controversy requirement. But this is not the only way to
establish the existence of a case for purposes of Article III. The reasonable
apprehension of suit doctrine exists to cabin declaratory judgment actions
where the only controversy surrounds a potential, future lawsuit.
Teva, 405 F.3d at 997 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
26. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
27. “This court held that where all that is present is negotiation unaccompanied by
threats of legal action, the setting is not sufficiently adverse to create a justiciable
controversy.” EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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In the 2007 Supreme Court case, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc.,
the Court reexamined Article III’s case or controversy requirement in
relation to the Declaratory Judgment Act.28 In this opinion, the majority
rejected the first prong of the Federal Circuit’s reasonable apprehension
of suit test on the grounds that it conflicted with several prior Supreme
Court decisions.29 In its place, the Court restored a broader declaratory
judgment standard to make jurisdiction coextensive with the maximum
case and controversy limit of the Constitution.30 According to the Court,
the necessary inquiry is “whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality
to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”31 The Federal
Circuit coined this analysis the “all circumstances” test.32 Two months
after MedImmune, in SanDisk v. STMicroelectronics, the Federal Circuit
followed the Supreme Court’s direction to abolish the reasonable
apprehension of suit test and replaced it with the all circumstances test.33

28. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1378.
29. CAT Tech L.L.C. v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Court in MedImmune found that the first prong of the reasonable apprehension of
suit test conflicted with Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273 (1941), and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007). Additionally, the
Court found the test to be in tension with Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993). MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11.
30. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. According to the Supreme Court, a case or
controversy requires:
[T]hat the dispute be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interests”; and that it be “real and substantial” and
“admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.”
Id. (quoting Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240–41).
31. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127.
32. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1345–46
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
33. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379, 1381, 1383. Recently, the Federal Circuit has
explored the role that the still existing second prong of the reasonable apprehension of
suit test can play in determining the totality of the circumstances. CAT Tech, 528 F.3d at
880. The second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test focuses upon the
declaratory judgment plaintiff’s conduct and examines whether there has been meaningful
preparation for potentially infringing activity. Id. The Federal Circuit flexed the power
of this analysis by boldly stating that “[i]f a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither ‘immediate’ nor
‘real’ and the requirements for justiciability have not been met.” Id.
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In SanDisk, the Federal Circuit held that Article III jurisdiction for a
patent declaratory judgment action may exist where patent holders
believe that they have patent rights which may prohibit another party’s
ongoing or planned activities, and where that other party contends that it
has the right to engage in the activities without a license.34 The patent
holder in SanDisk approached a potential licensee requesting a crosslicensing agreement.35 The patent holder, STMicroelectronics, offered a
detailed presentation that identified the manner in which SanDisk infringed
specific patent claims.36 However, the patent holder further told the
potential licensee that it had “absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue
SanDisk.”37 Following this incident, SanDisk sought, as plaintiff, a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the fourteen STMicroelectronics
patents that had been discussed during the cross-licensing negotiations.38
Overturning the district court’s grant of STMicroelectronics’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit
held that SanDisk met Article III’s jurisdictional requirements because
STMicroelectronics put SanDisk in a position of either pursuing
arguably illegal behavior, or abandoning what it asserted were rightful
activities.39 The Federal Circuit’s SanDisk interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s MedImmune standard represents a significant departure from
prior Federal Circuit decisions on patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction,
and raises new questions related to interpreting Article III jurisdiction
under the Declaratory Judgment Act discussed in the following sections
of this Comment.
III. THREE POTENTIALLY NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SANDISK
Three repercussions of the SanDisk decision are examined below:
First, SanDisk significantly broadens declaratory judgment jurisdiction;
second, SanDisk narrows effective use of covenants not to sue; and third,
SanDisk limits the district court’s discretion to deny an otherwise
allowable declaratory judgment suit. As a result, this Comment will
show that the Federal Circuit’s broad declaratory judgment jurisdiction
interpretation in SanDisk threatens to chill licensing negotiations by
unfairly increasing the leverage of potential patent infringers during licensing
negotiation, limiting the ability of the parties to negotiate around declaratory

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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judgment suits, and preventing district judges from using their discretion
to level the playing field during negotiations.
A. SanDisk Overbroadens Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction
The SanDisk decision fortified the interpretation replacing the reasonable
apprehension of suit test with the more expansive all circumstances test
proposed in MedImmune and adopted from Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co.40 Under the all circumstances test, the question
in each case is “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”41 Whereas the old test limited
jurisdiction to reasonable apprehension, the all circumstances test
broadens the scope of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to include
circumstances such as a patent holder’s “position” or “willingness” to
litigate.42
There are some positive benefits resulting from the broadened
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, including significantly weakening the
power of “patent trolls.”43 Patent trolls are loosely defined as patent
holding entities that do not manufacture, compete, or incorporate their
patents into any product.44 Patent trolls take advantage of the patent
40. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); SanDisk, 480
F.3d at 1378; see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
41. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1378.
42. Id. at 1381. See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Whether intended or not, the now more lenient legal standard
facilitates or enhances the availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent
cases.”).
43. The term patent troll became popular during Intel’s litigation with a little
known intellectual property licensing company, TechSearch. Intel’s then assistant
general counsel, Peter Detkin, described a patent troll as “somebody who tries to make a
lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have no intention of practicing
and in most cases never practiced.” Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an
Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 159, 163 (2006) (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build
a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005)). See also Irfan A.
Lateef & Joshua Stowell, A Supreme End to Patent Trolls?, ORANGE COUNTY LAW.,
Aug. 2007, at 18–19. Patent trolls have a “tendency to lie in wait for infringers—like the
fabled troll that lurks under the bridge to prevent others from using the bridge that he is
not even using for himself . . . .” Id.
44. This definition of a patent troll fails to distinguish between trolls and an
inventor or even a savvy investor who acquires patent rights and seeks to license them in
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system by buying patents solely to assert their rights against others.45
Opponents of patent trolls criticize their business practices as disincentivizing
research and development by increasing the litigation costs associated
with bringing new products to the market.46 Some analysts believe that a
more encompassing declaratory judgment jurisdiction standard will
weaken the power of patent trolls by allowing for a declaratory judgment
action whenever patent trolls aggressively pursue licensing agreements.47
However, even though the broadened declaratory judgment jurisdiction
potentially exposes patent trolls to more litigation, high litigation costs
inevitably arising out of declaratory judgment suits deter many accused
infringers from ever utilizing declaratory judgments. For example, in
the year 2000, mid-range patent infringement litigation cost an average
of $797,000 through discovery and $1,499,000 through trial.48 Therefore,
many accused infringers will find this method of resisting trolls to be
unavailable due to the high cost burden; while the real impact of a
broadened declaratory judgment standard is suffered by smaller patent
holders who, due to insufficient funds, cannot take advantage of their
patent’s positive benefits because they cannot afford to litigate a
declaratory judgment lawsuit.49

good faith instead of manufacturing or using the patents in commerce directly themselves. A
troll is perhaps more properly a party that seeks to license in bad faith, for example, by
investing in patent rights solely to assert them against deep-pocketed successful manufacturers,
or even sandbagging a company that unknowingly incorporates a patented component
into a larger assembly or inadvertently uses a patent while establishing market success.
By waiting to negotiate a license until after the alleged infringer has sunk significant
costs into a market success, with little regard as to the validity or strength of the patent’s
being asserted, a troll is said to be acting in bad faith. Here is a proposed new definition:
First, a patent troll would be a company that receives no benefit from
excluding others because it does not have a competitive product nor does it
plan to develop one. . . . Second, a patent troll’s tactic would be to use threat
of litigation and its associated costs to force others into licensing agreements
without closely scrutinizing the validity and strength of the patent . . . .
Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106
MICH. L. REV. 305, 307 n.2 (2007) (quoting Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a Troll?
Not a Simple Answer, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 166 (2006)).
45. See Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 21.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 22.
48. Richard P. Beem, Winning Patent Fights Without Spending a Bundle, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 26, 2003, at 6.
49. Rantanen, supra note 43, at 180 (advocating that a potential licensee litigate as
opposed to license because it will put the licensee in a dominant negotiating position
over the patentee). “If the infringer litigates, rather than taking a license, the patentee
will only gain a small amount, since the litigation costs for the patentee include both the
possibility of losing the patent entirely and the actual costs of the litigation, while the
return is likely to be relatively small.” Id. at 181.
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Further, the potential troll-deterrent effect of a broader declaratory
judgment standard may be outweighed by significant negative effects.
Federal Circuit Judge Bryson concurred with the SanDisk decision, but
warned that “virtually any invitation to take a paid license relating to the
prospective licensee’s activities would give rise to an Article III case or
controversy if the prospective licensee elects to assert that its conduct
does not fall within the scope of the patent.”50 One district court has
50. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring).
In the aftermath of MedImmune, SanDisk, and subsequent district court decisions, a
patent holder’s offer to license a patent to a potential patent infringer constitutes an
assertion of patent rights and significantly increases the patent holders exposure to a
declaratory judgment action to attempt to invalidate the patent. Therefore, the only way
to avoid declaratory judgment jurisdiction when seeking a license is to preemptively file
a claim for patent infringement against the potential licensee.
Although filing an infringement suit exposes the patent holder’s patents to the counter
claims of unenforceability and invalidity, there is one positive aspect that can result from
filing first: Any negotiation following a lawsuit is understood as a settlement; in a patent
infringement lawsuit, if such a settlement is reached, it acts as a collateral bar against any
future claims of invalidity or unenforceability. See Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Flex-Foot, CRP brought a declaratory judgment action
against Flex-Foot, seeking a declaration that one of Flex-Foot’s patents was invalid. Id.
at 1363–64. While a summary judgment motion was pending, however, the parties
settled and agreed to a corresponding licensing agreement. Id. at 1363. In the settlement
agreement, CRP waived its right to challenge the validity and enforceability of the patent
within the license agreement. Id. Absent a settlement agreement, a provision such as
this is not enforced by the courts. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
However, the Federal Circuit held:
Once an accused infringer has challenged patent validity, has had an opportunity to
conduct discovery on validity issues, and has elected to voluntarily dismiss the
litigation with prejudice under a settlement agreement containing a clear and
unambiguous undertaking not to challenge validity and/or enforceability of the
patent in suit, the accused infringer is contractually estopped from raising any
such challenge in any subsequent proceeding.
Flex-Foot, 238 F.3d at 1370.
The Federal Circuit allows a settlement to contractually estop further validity or
enforceability challenges because the technical requirements of contract doctrine are
significantly outweighed by the policy of upholding settlement litigation. Hemstreet v.
Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However, there are obvious problems
that follow from filing an infringement suit before negotiating. First, the negotiation is
instantly soured. The parties are now directly aligned against each other and the chance
for a friendly licensing deal is significantly diminished. Second, filing an infringement
suit is going to open the door to compulsive counterclaims, such as patent invalidity and
unenforceability. Thus, the two claims the patent holder was seeking to avoid in a
declaratory judgment suit will most assuredly be filed against the patent holder in a
compulsory counterclaim. However, the one advantage of filing first is that the patent
holder can choose the forum. See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d
897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The general rule favors the forum of the first-filed action,
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already expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction to this extreme. In
Crutchfield New Media, L.L.C. v. Charles E. Hill & Associates,51 the
patent holder offered to negotiate a license, but, before negotiations
could begin, the potential licensee brought a declaratory judgment suit
for invalidity and noninfringement of the patents being offered in the
license.52 The district court sustained the declaratory judgment and held
that there was a valid case or controversy because “it is clear that Hill
was of the opinion that Crutchfield was engaging in allegedly infringing
activity or it would not have offered a license . . . .”53 Under this standard,
patent holders who offer to negotiate a license can inadvertently open up
the door to potential declaratory judgment actions. In this way, the
expanded MedImmune and SanDisk declaratory judgment standard
threatens to chill patent licensing discussions and negotiations.
A prospective licensee can effectively end a licensing negotiation by
demanding that the patent holder “put up or shut up.”54 In such a
situation, the prospective licensee can trap the patent holder by inquiring
as to whether or not the patent holder thinks the prospective licensee is
infringing on any patents—a yes answer could yield a declaratory
judgment and a no answer will render negotiations pointless.55 Since the
SanDisk standard renders licensing negotiations more uncertain, patent
holders will have to seek ways to avoid being forced to defend their
patents in a possibly unfavorable court merely because they offered to
discuss a license.56 In addition to the prospect of being dragged into an
unfavorable court, declaratory judgments are expensive to litigate. Thus,
small inventors, universities, and research institutions, generally, will be
whether or not it is a declaratory judgment action.”). This is a big fear in declaratory
judgment suits because different forums have different rules and some are more
favorable to patent holders than others. See also Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum
Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 570, 571 (2007).
51. Crutchfield New Media, L.L.C. v. Charles E. Hill & Assoc., No. 1:06-cv-0837LJM-JMS, 2007 WL 1320750 (S.D. Ind. May 4, 2007).
52. Id. at *2–3.
53. Id. at *2. Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., No. 4:07-CV-543
(CEJ), 2008 WL 294291, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (finding that a patent holder’s
letter asking a prospective licensee to “consider” a license did not amount to a course of
conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce patent rights), appeal
dismissed, No. 2008-1232, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13877 (Fed. Cir. May 30, 2008).
54. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring).
55. Id. See also Philip Nelson & Paul Conover, Patent Notice Letters After the
Supreme Court’s MedImmune Decision: Prelude to a Deal, or a License to Sue?,
ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Aug. 2007, at 38, 40.
56. See Steve Seidenberg, Judgment Day: SanDisk Decision Opens the Door to
Increased Patent Litigation, INSIDECOUNSEL, Aug. 2007, at 20, 22 (“Right now there is a
standstill in licensing activity . . . . Corporations large and small are trying to figure out
what they can do to protect themselves.” (quoting David Fox, a patent attorney in the
Houston office of Fulbright & Jaworski)).
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the most vulnerable under the SanDisk precedent because they are less
likely to have the multibillion dollar resources that large corporations
have to defend their patents.57
The majority opinion in SanDisk seemed to recognize this threat to
licensing negotiation and responded in a footnote that a confidentiality
agreement would have avoided the risk of a declaratory judgment action.58
However, confidentiality agreements create three additional problems.59
First, federal courts interpret confidentiality agreements in accordance
with state contract law.60 Notwithstanding choice of law conflicts, state
contract law has a propensity to be ambiguous, amorphous, and unpredictable.61
Second, as acknowledged in his concurrence, Judge Bryson noted the
absurdity surrounding confidential agreements because any party that
contemplates bringing a declaratory judgment action would have no
incentive to enter into such an agreement.62 Third, such a request for a
confidentiality agreement could itself, ironically, backfire and spark a
declaratory judgment lawsuit under the SanDisk precedent.63
B. SanDisk Limits the Effectiveness of Covenants Not to Sue
Following the all circumstances test, the majority in SanDisk found
STMicroelectronics’ direct and unequivocal statement that it had no plan
whatsoever to sue did not eliminate any actual controversy and so did

57. David Morrill, High Court Ruling Leaves Companies in Pickle, OAKLAND
TRIB., Mar. 19, 2007, at D5. Yali Friedman, author of Building Biotechnology, said that
“[t]ypically, universities are less savvy in developing and negotiating patents, so they
could be more vulnerable . . . .” Id.
58. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1375 n.1.
59. Osteotech, Inc. v. Regeneration Techs., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-04249-FLW, 2008
WL 4449564 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2008).
60. Id. at *3.
61. See id. In Osteotech, the court excluded relevant communications between
two parties regarding alleged patent infringement. Id. at *5. However, the court did not
limit its analysis to the text of the agreement; rather, the court considered amorphous
elements, such as the presence of counsel and each party’s familiarity with confidentiality
agreements. Id. Additionally, the confidentiality agreement, although intended to protect the
plaintiff, backfired because it precluded the plaintiff from using communication covered
under the agreement as evidence asserting the defendant’s actual knowledge of patent
infringement. Id.
62. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 n.1 (Bryson, J., concurring).
63. Nelson & Conover, supra note 55, at 40. “However, for the vigilant patent
holder attempting to police the marketplace, such an agreement may be difficult to obtain
and the very act of requesting it might be enough to trigger a declaratory judgment
lawsuit.” Id.
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not render SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claim moot.64 Thus, SanDisk
precedent threatens to significantly narrow the ability of a covenant not
to sue to avoid declaratory judgment actions.
Perhaps in recognition of the negative implications associated with not
recognizing covenants not to sue, the Federal Circuit has twice refined
the SanDisk holding.65 First, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., a generic drug applicant, Teva, challenged
Novartis by asserting in an “Abbreviated New Drug Application” that
five of Novartis’s brand drug patents were invalid.66 Despite Novartis’s
inaction in challenging Teva’s assertion, the Federal Circuit upheld a
justiciable case or controversy for Teva and acknowledged that the only
way a controversy might not exist would be in the rare “circumstance in
which . . . the patent owner and brand drug company have given the generic
[drug] applicant a covenant not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge
that the generic applicant’s drug does not infringe.”67 Second, in Benitec
Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., patent holder Benitec brought an
infringement claim against Nucleonics who counterclaimed seeking a
declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability against Benitec’s
patents.68 Benitec subsequently dropped its original lawsuit and filed for
a dismissal of Nucleonics’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.69 In its appellate brief, Benitec covenanted and promised
not to sue Nucleonics for any activities or products occurring on or
before the date of dismissal.70 In light of the covenant not to sue, the
court granted Benitec’s motion to dismiss after finding no showing of
sufficient immediacy and reality to support declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.71
The Nucleonics court directly compared the covenant not to sue with
the covenant offered in SanDisk, and found the following distinction:
STMicroelectronics only stated that it did not intend to sue SanDisk,
while Benitec clarified that it would not sue Nucleonics.72 Also,
64. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1382–83.
65. See Benitec Austl., Ltd., v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1347–49 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
66. Teva Pharm., 482 F.3d at 1334–35.
67. Id. at 1343. See also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d
1278, 1296–97 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that even when a covenant not to sue
extinguishes all patent lawsuits, a justiciable controversy exists if a brand drug patent
holder can still act in a way that would prevent the FDA from approving a generic drug
application).
68. Nucleonics, 495 F.3d at 1342.
69. Id. at 1343.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1349.
72. Id. at 1347–48.
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STMicroelectronics had engaged in a course of conduct that showed a
willingness and preparedness to sue, while Benitec made its covenant
and sought dismissal after it concluded that a recent case legally
precluded its original infringement claim.73 At first glance, Nucleonics
seems to limit SanDisk’s expansive precedent, but upon closer scrutiny,
the court actually made its decision based upon Benitec’s legal inability
to file suit against Nucleonics, not upon Benitec’s covenant not to sue.74
Further, as subsequent cases show, district courts are ignoring a possible
limiting effect of Nucleonics and are not recognizing any material
change to the SanDisk precedent regarding the inability of covenants not
to sue to avoid declaratory judgment jurisdiction.75
For example, in FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Construction Group,76
the situation was similar to Nucleonics. FieldTurf voluntarily dismissed
its original infringement lawsuit against Sports Construction Group and
subsequently filed for a motion to dismiss Sports Construction Group’s
declaratory judgment counterclaims against FieldTurf relating to its
patents.77 To eliminate any further case or controversy, FieldTurf submitted
a covenant not to sue along with its voluntary dismissal.78 However, the
court held that the covenant not to sue was too narrow and did not
preclude FieldTurf from re-filing a different infringement suit.79 The
court distinguished FieldTurf’s covenant not to sue from the one in
Nucleonics on the grounds that FieldTurf still had a legal right to
institute an infringement claim against Sports Construction Group at a
later date.80
The court’s decision in FieldTurf was focused mainly upon one
particular element of the Nucleonics opinion: whether the declaratory

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1346. The court emphasized Benitec’s recognition of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Merck that prevented Benitec from filing an infringement action until
after Nucleonics filed a new drug application, which Nucleonics acknowledged it would
not do until at least 2010 or 2012. Id.
75. See FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Constr. Group, LLC, 507 F. Supp. 2d 801,
807 (N.D. Ohio 2007); WS Packaging Group, Inc. v. Global Commerce Group, L.L.C.,
505 F. Supp. 561, 565 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
76. FieldTurf USA, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
77. Id. at 803.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 807–08.
80. Id. at 808 (“FieldTurf has maintained its right to institute an infringement
cause of action against SCG for its offers to sell, sales, or installations at locations other
than at Concord University.”).
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judgment defendant has any cause of action against the declaratory
judgment plaintiff.81 Under such precedent, a covenant not to sue that
eliminates the current, or instant, case or controversy is not effective
unless it eliminates all other potential infringement causes of action that
that party has against the declaratory judgment plaintiff.82 This is an
incongruous proposition for two reasons. First, MedImmune limits
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to “the facts alleged.”83 A covenant not
to sue should not have to cover all possible relationships between the
parties, but only those that deal with the current facts alleged. It is unjust
to hold a covenant not to sue to a standard that incorporates facts beyond
those alleged in the lawsuit. Second, such a precedent renders licensing
agreements pointless. Similar to the “put up or shut up” scenario
articulated in Judge Bryson’s concurrence in SanDisk,84 the only
effective way to eliminate the risk of a declaratory judgment action
during licensing negotiations under this precedent is for the patent holder to
forfeit any possible future enforcement of rights in the invention, which
makes the current licensing negotiation pointless. A patent holder’s
entire bargaining power hinges on the threat of enforcement against the
other party.85 Therefore, since covenants not to sue that completely
eliminate any potential liability gut a patent holder’s bargaining position,
the courts have effectively eliminated the desirability of using a covenant
not to sue to eliminate declaratory judgment jurisdiction. This, in turn,
may also render licensing negotiations pointless because the patent
holder would have to deny any future infringement claims in order to
81. This is of such importance that the court mentions it twice verbatim. See id.
82. Two recent district court decisions have turned away from the notion that
effective covenants not to sue have to extinguish all possible causes of action between
two parties. In Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Products Corp., 246 F.R.D. 579 (E.D. Mo.
2007), a patent holder’s covenant not to sue sufficiently eliminated any case of actual
controversy and divested the court of jurisdiction even though the covenant did not cover
a supplemental patent that was not at issue in the original claim. Id. at 590. The court
reasoned that the patent excluded from the covenant not to sue was distinctly different
from the patents currently at issue and because no demands or threats of litigation were
made through this patent, there was no remaining controversy of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Id. at 590–91. Similarly, in
Crossbow Technology, Inc. v. YH Technology, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2007),
the court concluded that despite the existence of related patents, the covenant not to sue
sufficiently removed all patents at issue in the case and thus extinguished declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. Id. at 1122.
83. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). “[T]he
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Id.
(quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
84. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1385–86 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (Bryson, J., concurring).
85. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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negotiate a license without threat of a declaratory judgment suit, but this
denial of claims obliterates a patent holder’s bargaining position.
C. SanDisk Limits District Court Discretion
The third implication of SanDisk is that it limits the district court’s
discretion to deny jurisdiction over an otherwise allowable declaratory
judgment action. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
Federal taxes . . . , any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.86

In the absence of a must, the Federal Circuit has, before SanDisk,
interpreted the Act’s use of may to mean both “that the court is
authorized to declare legal rights and relations, and that in appropriate
circumstances the court may decline to do so.”87 Therefore, even if an
actual case or controversy exists, courts have the discretion to decline
jurisdiction.88 The Supreme Court has held that the district court is in
the most appropriate position to understand how the facts of the case
relate in regards to both the fitness and usefulness of a declaratory
judgment resolution.89 A district court’s discretion is constrained by the
Declaratory Judgment Act, which has been interpreted by the Federal
Circuit to limit the district court’s discretion to the bounds of practicality
and wise judicial administration.90

86. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added).
87. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The
Federal Circuit’s interpretation has also been accepted by the Supreme Court. See
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 136.
88. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoft Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952).
89. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995).
90. EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 814. See also Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media
Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (presenting four ways a district court
can abuse its discretion: “(1) [T]he court’s decision [is] clearly unreasonable, arbitrary,
or fanciful; (2) the decision [is] based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court’s
findings [are] clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the
court rationally could have based its decision” (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
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In SanDisk, however, the Federal Circuit further limited the district
court’s discretion.91 The district court in SanDisk noted, in a footnote,
that “even if it had subject matter jurisdiction over the instant claims, it
would exercise its discretion and decline to decide them.”92 However,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s decision was made in the
context of the reasonable apprehension of suit test, thus they “expect that
in the absence of additional facts, the case will be entertained on the
merits on remand.”93 In light of this unusual holding that removed the
district court’s customary discretion, Judge Bryson’s concurrence took
issue with the majority, and would limit the SanDisk holding to allow
the district court to exercise its discretion on remand to address issues
such as a possible parallel infringement action in another district.94
The reasoning of Judge Bryson’s argument becomes apparent in a
later Federal Circuit case, Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media
Technologies, Ltd.95 In this case, the district court underlined two
reasons to decline jurisdiction: The justiciability of the case was too
close to call and the overall facts created the “appearance that Plaintiffs
filed these lawsuits as an intimidation tactic to gain leverage in the
licensing negotiations.”96 The Federal Circuit held that it was an abuse
of discretion for the district judge to decline to exercise his discretion to
hear the suit, noting that it was inappropriate to infer that the suit was
filed as an intimidation tactic in the absence of affirmative evidence.97
The majority opinion stated, “Even if these suits have had the effect of
placing appellants in a more favorable negotiating position, that effect is

91. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
92. Id. (quoting SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 04-04379, 2005
WL 5801276, at *8 n.30 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005)).
93. Id.
94. “I would allow the district court to reconsider that issue based on all the
circumstances, not just ‘additional facts’ not previously before the district court, as the
terms of this court’s remand would seem to require.” Id. at 1385–86 n.2 (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
95. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1271.
96. Id. at 1289.
97. Id. The court also narrowed a former opinion, EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1996), that allowed the district judge to exercise the judge’s
discretion not to hear the case under similar circumstances. The court distinguished Sony
Electronics from EMC by stating that the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the latter
“called the defendant the day after the suit was filed ‘and explained that the declaratory
judgment complaint had been filed as “merely a defensive step” . . . .’” Sony Elecs., 497
F.3d at 1289 (quoting EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815). Thus, the Federal Circuit determined
that the district court in EMC had proper evidence to deny jurisdiction based on the
belief that the declaratory judgment was a “tactical measure filed in order to improve
[the plaintiff’s] posture in the ongoing negotiations.” Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289
(quoting EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815).
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not a sufficient reason to decline to hear the suit.”98 The Federal Circuit
has limited the district court judge’s discretion to refuse to hear a patent
declaratory judgment case to only matters of time and resources.99 This
precedent undercuts a judge’s ability to prevent forum shopping or other
“nefarious”100 litigation moves on the part of declaratory judgment
plaintiffs. Limiting the district court judge’s discretion to decline to hear
a suit allows the potential licensee to unfairly take advantage of the
judicial system during licensing negotiations.
Ultimately SanDisk’s three negative repercussions are likely to
significantly chill patent licensing negotiations out of court because all
three open the door to greater availability of a declaratory judgment. A
broad declaratory judgment jurisdiction puts the patent holder in a nowin situation between offering a license and risking the expense and
possible unfair bargaining position following a declaratory judgment
suit, or never offering a license and never taking advantage of the rights
to exclusively make, use, or sell their invention as granted to patent
holders.101 The limited applicability of a covenant not to sue to prevent
a declaratory judgment suit takes away one avenue that could possibly
level the playing field between a patent holder and a potential licensee in
negotiations.102 Finally, limiting a district court judge’s ability to deny
adjudicating a declaratory judgment suit when out-of-court negotiations

98. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289.
99. Post-SanDisk, the Federal Circuit allowed district judges to exercise their discretion
to not hear a declaratory judgment only in cases involving parallel infringement suits or
patent reevaluations. See Cellco P’ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
100. Sony Elecs., 497 F.3d at 1289.
101. Section 271 of Title 35 of the United States Code gives the patent holder an
infringement cause of action against anyone who makes, uses, sells, offers for sale, or
imports the invention described in the claims of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
102. Michael A. Ladra and Lillian Ewing argue:
There is no longer a safe haven for a patentee to offer a license and expressly
state that there is no intent to sue for infringement. . . . The potential licensee,
who has more leverage after SanDisk, can respond with “put up or shut up,”
and virtually any response by the patentee to the potential licensee, other than a
disavowal of patent coverage, will expose the patentee to a potential declaratory
judgment action. The dissent in SanDisk correctly asserted that there is potentially
no “stopping point short of allowing declaratory judgment actions in
virtually any case in which the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license
elects to dispute the need for a license and then to sue the patentee.”
Michael A. Ladra & Lillian Ewing, Declaratory Judgment Practices After SanDisk v.
STMicroelectronics, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 185, 198 (2007)
(quoting SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1385 (Bryson, J., concurring)).
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are proceeding chills the motivation of a potential licensee to negotiate
without first attempting a declaratory judgment suit.
IV. POLICY SUPPORT FOR A CHANGE IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT PRECEDENT
Declaratory judgment jurisdiction seeks to balance two competing
policy considerations: conserving limited judicial resources by declining
jurisdiction and allowing a party threatened with legal action to obtain
an early judgment regarding its rights and liabilities.103 Congressional
intent behind the Declaratory Judgment Act was particularly focused on
preventing “avoidable damages from being incurred by a person uncertain
of his rights and threatened with damage by delayed adjudication.”104
The 1934 Congress sought to balance the economic leverage once
dominated by patent holders through the availability of an early judicial
resolution of rights.105 Congress’s willingness to have judicial resolution
available for alleged infringers was a response to the business realities
these alleged infringers faced—to level the negotiating table that had
previously been tipped heavily toward patent holders.106 This Comment
argues that the MedImmune and SanDisk expanded declaratory judgment
jurisdiction standard has tipped the negotiating table too far in favor of
alleged infringers, and so the policy rationale behind the Declaratory
Judgment Act supports a change in declaratory judgment jurisdiction to
re-level the field and conserve limited judicial resources.
Three recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions bridle the
patent holder’s power enough to render the need for an expansive declaratory
judgment jurisdiction unnecessary: In re Seagate Technology, EBay v.
Mercexchange, and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.107 As discussed
below, the aggregate of these decisions is to ease the burden faced by an
103. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
104. Id. (citing EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 803–04 (2d. ed.
1941)).
105. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,564–65, 10,919 (1934); 78 CONG. REC. 8224 (1934).
106. Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring
the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 905
(1997).
In 1934, Congress sought to balance the tremendous economic leverage enjoyed by
patentees by providing accused infringers with the opportunity to seek judicial
resolution of claims of non-infringement and/or invalidity. . . . The courts’
willingness to entertain declaratory judgment actions brought by alleged
infringers in such circumstances was based on their recognition of the
‘business realities’ the alleged infringers faced.
Id. at 905–06.
107. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); EBay, Inc. v.
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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alleged infringer, and so the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions, expanding
declaratory judgment jurisdiction go too far, extending beyond the
optimum policy balance sought between patent holders and alleged
patent infringers, and instead creating “uncertainty and inefficiency in
the area of patent notification . . . .”108
In re Seagate eases the burden on patent infringers resisting
allegations of willful infringement and the resulting treble damages, by
eliminating the duty of due care and emphasizing that there is no
affirmative obligation to obtain an opinion of counsel.109 As a result, a
patent holder’s boilerplate charge of “willful infringement” is no longer
a simple burden to satisfy.110 The Federal Circuit replaced the negligence
standard of willful infringement with an objective recklessness standard—
this requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood of infringement,
and the infringer knew or, because of its obviousness, should have known
about the high likelihood of infringement.111
In re Seagate impacts declaratory judgment jurisdiction in two ways.
First, because patent owners will need to give potential infringers
detailed notice of how they are allegedly infringing to set the stage for
showing reckless disregard of their patents, these notices will likely be
sufficient to invoke declaratory judgment jurisdiction.112 In the absence
of a detailed letter, potential infringers will likely not be subject to a suit
for willful infringement of the patent in question. This limits the patent
holder’s negotiating power by forcing a choice: either send a detailed
letter and invoke declaratory judgment jurisdiction, or send a benign
letter to avoid declaratory judgment lawsuits but forego claiming willful
infringement.113
In re Seagate’s second impact is that it runs counter to a fundamental
policy behind expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction. As mentioned, a
cornerstone policy of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to reduce the
likelihood of possible infringers finding themselves in an unfair position,
either having to risk accruing huge damages while awaiting a patent
108. Nelson & Conover, supra note 55, at 42.
109. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
110. Thomas Fitzpatrick et al., In re Seagate Technology: Closing the Gate on
Willful Infringement, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=51720.
111. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
112. See Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 110.
113. Id.
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holder’s choice to file an infringement suit, or having to prematurely
shut down their business.114 This same rationale was one of the driving
reasons behind the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions to expand declaratory
judgment jurisdiction, specifically that “[t]he rule that a plaintiff must
destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble damages
and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of
its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”115
Willful infringement of a patent exposes the infringing party to treble
damages, and in such cases, betting the farm is an accurate metaphor.116
However, in the wake of In re Seagate, if a patent holder requests a
license without giving the potential infringer a detailed report of their
infringement, this request is not enough evidence to support a willful
infringement claim against the potential patent infringer.117 Good policy
would dictate that standards for notice of willful infringement should be
consistent with declaratory judgment jurisdiction.118 Therefore, since
the standard to establish willful infringement requires a detailed report of
infringement, declaratory judgment jurisdiction should not be granted
against patentees that merely offer notice of possible patent infringement.
The unfair risk of an alleged infringer accruing huge damages is now
reduced by In re Seagate because the uncertainty of possible treble damages
114. “[I]n promulgating the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress intended ‘to avoid
accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early
adjudication without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit.’” Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673–74 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting E.
Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937)).
115. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 548 U.S. 118, 134 (2007) (emphasis
added). Also, the court in SanDisk paraphrased this same argument stating, “SanDisk
need not ‘bet the farm,’ so to speak, and risk a suit for infringement by cutting off licensing
discussions and continuing in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its
legal rights.” SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (footnote omitted).
116. In cases of willful infringement, “the court may enter judgment thereon for any
sum above the amount found by the verdict as the actual damages sustained, according to
the circumstances of the case, not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict,
together with the costs.” Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870).
117. Even if the opinion letters served as an objectively high likelihood of patent
infringement, the patentee would still need to prove that this objectively defined risk
“was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer.” In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
118. Dolak, supra note 106, at 946. Dolak also states: “[T]he issues of notice of
infringement and declaratory judgment jurisdiction should be treated as jurisprudentially
connected because of the policies each legal principle is intended to serve and the practical
realities that would-be litigants must consider in the operation of their enterprises.” Id. at
938 (footnote omitted). Dolak wrote this article before the MedImmune, SanDisk, and In
re Seagate decisions, so she advocates a more liberal declaratory judgment standard.
She argues that it is unconstitutional to deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction when
notice of infringement letters are delivered and when these same letters can be used as
evidence for willful infringement against potential infringers. Id. at 946.
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can no longer be attached without triggering declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. Thus, one key policy rationale for expanding declaratory
judgment jurisdiction is mitigated, at least in part, by In re Seagate.
In EBay v. Mercexchange, the Supreme Court eliminated the Federal
Circuit’s previously observed strong presumption in favor of injunctive
relief for patent infringement, and instead required a four factor test be
used to determine if an injunction is appropriate based on the facts in
any given case.119 This decision limits the power of the patent troll, who
often relies on the threat of a possible injunction that could shut down an
alleged infringer’s entire business to leverage licensing negotiations. As
explained earlier, declaratory judgment jurisdiction is a strong disincentive
to patent trolls and significantly weakens their leverage.120 For example,
a motivating factor behind the Federal Circuit’s Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. decision was that declaratory
judgment jurisdiction limits the ability of the patent troll to engage in
extrajudicial patent enforcement with “scare-the-customer-and-run tactics.”121
But after EBay, a patent troll’s leverage over an alleged infringer is
already reduced, due to the reduced prospect of obtaining an injunction;
thus, expanded declaratory judgment jurisdiction for the purpose of
deterring patent trolls is no longer quite as justified.
Before EBay, there was a strong incentive for possible infringers to
use a declaratory judgment to avoid costly injunctions that had the
capability to completely shut down a product or business.122 Since the
EBay decision, district courts implementing injunctions under the EBay
rule have almost universally held that when the patent holder manufactures
or sells a product that competes with the accused product, the patent
holder can successfully prove irreparable harm. But when the patent
holder does not manufacture or sell a competitive product, courts refuse
119. In the four factor test, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
EBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
120. See Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 22.
121. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1336 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
122. Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 21. “From the perspective of a potential
infringer, the Federal Circuit’s old rule heavily incentivized settlement and licensing.”
Id.
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to recognize any cognizable irreparable harm necessary for an injunction
against the accused infringer, the irreparable harm test is not satisfied.123
Thus, the primary factor in determining whether a court will grant an
injunction is the plaintiff’s status as a market competitor.124 By definition,
patent trolls do not manufacture products that incorporate their patents—
so the EBay decision significantly limits the patent troll’s scare-thecustomer-and-run tactics, because the patent troll can no longer threaten
injunctions. Therefore, the policy justification to expand declaratory
judgment jurisdiction to level the negotiating table against too powerful
patent-holders is again reduced.
Last, the Supreme Court has made it easier for a patent challenger to
invalidate a patent by showing obviousness.125 In KSR International Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court narrowly limited the Federal Circuit’s
“Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation” (TSM) test for when multiple prior
art references could be combined to show a patent was invalid as obvious.
Instead, the Court established a simpler analysis for determining obviousness,
which lowers the hurdle to get a patent declared invalid by permitting a
greater range of prior art to be used to prove a patent invalid for
obviousness.126
123. See Keith Slenkovich, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in Ebay, MedImmune,
and KSR Deliver Triple Dose of Bad News to Non-Practicing Patent Holders (Aka
“Patent Trolls”), MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Sept. 7, 2007, available at http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=52066. In the short time since the EBay decision,
courts are reflecting the trend of granting permanent injunctions only when both parties
manufacture a competitive product. Several cases exemplify the courts’ willingness to
grant permanent injunctions when both parties manufacture and sell competitive
products. See, e.g., Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007
WL 1730112 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); MGM Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys.,
L.L.C., 505 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Novozymes v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 592, 596 (D. Del. 2007); Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc.,
Nos. CIV A 06-757, CIV A 06-5166, CIV A 04-1689, 2007 WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar.
20, 2007); 02 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. CIV A 2-04-CV32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., No.
CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2006); Telequip Corp. v. Change
Exch., No. 5:01-CV-1748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006); TiVo, Inc. v.
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
124. See Benjamin H. Diessel, supra note 44. Diessel argues:
Denying injunctions to plaintiffs who do not compete in the market with their
invention yet are willing licensors and granting injunctions to plaintiffs who
compete in the market against the defendant are consistent with a rule that
requires market competition to obtain a permanent injunction, and thus far
courts have followed these practices.
Id. at 318.
125. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct., 1745–46 (2007). Non-obviousness is
a condition of patentability codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Non-obviousness requires
that the patented product be one that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not know
how to create given the same materials. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000); KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
126. Under the Federal Circuit’s TSM test, “a patent claim is only proved obvious if
‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the
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The KSR decision deters patent holders from engaging in tactics that
will likely bring an invalidity suit against any of their patents.127 In
particular, patent holders whose patents lack commercial success suffer
the most because one of the objective indicators of non-obviousness
emphasized in KSR is commercial success.128 Additionally, a patent
holder most often risks more during a declaratory judgment action than
an alleged patent infringer.129 If a patent holder loses an invalidity suit,
the ability to assert that patent’s rights against all competitors is lost.130
Therefore, KSR empowers the declaratory judgment plaintiff with a
powerful weapon against patent holders in negotiation.
The KSR decision risks upsetting the delicate negotiation balance
between a patent holder and potential patent infringer. During a license
negotiation, a patent holder’s leverage is dependent upon the validity of
the patents being offered.131 Likewise, a potential patent infringer must
weigh the cost of invalidating the offered patent against the cost of a

prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in
the art.” KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,
1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Under KSR, to determine obviousness the court questions
“whether . . . a designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created by
developments in the field of endeavor, would have” thought of the patent as obvious.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1744.
127. Because the KSR decision lowers the bar for obviousness, “[p]arties charged
with infringement will have a stronger legal basis for invalidating patents, particularly on
summary judgment. Thus, the decision decreases the impact of threatened patent suits,
especially when weak patents are at issue.” Lateef & Stowell, supra note 43, at 22.
128. “Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject
matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.” KSR, 127 S. Ct. at
1734 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
129. Jason Rantanen argues:
[T]he only positive payoff available to the patentee through litigation is if there
is a finding of no invalidity and infringement. In contrast, the infringer will
receive a positive payoff either if the patent is declared invalid, or if they are
found not to infringe. This game also demonstrates why the patent troll may
be disincentivized to enter the litigation. If the patentee wins, the payoff is only
modest. If the patentee loses, however, the penalty ranges from moderately severe
to extremely severe, depending on the form of the loss.
Rantanen, supra note 43, at 180.
130. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971) (holding that a patent holder is estopped from asserting the validity of a patent
that has been held to be invalid in a prior federal court suit where the patent holder had
full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent).
131. Rantanen, supra note 43, at 195–96.
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potential license for the patent.132 Therefore, when the difficulty of
invalidating a patent is reduced, the potential patent infringer can take
advantage of the patent holder’s uncertainty over the validity of the patent.
Because a declaratory judgment allows the potential patent infringer to
challenge the patent being offered, the threat of declaratory judgment
becomes a stronger tool that potential infringers can use to gain leverage
in licensing negotiations. Therefore, by adding a looser declaratory
judgment jurisdiction to an already lower burden to invalidate a patent,
the delicate balance of a license negotiation shifts too far to the advantage of
the potential patent infringer. As a result, the patent holder is once again
put in the unfavorable scenario of pursuing a license and risking a
declaration of invalidity, or not pursuing a license and being denied the
benefits associated with holding a patent.
In sum, in a situation where a patent holder wants to flex a patent in
order to get a license, the patent holder must consider several negative
factors: the potential that a willful infringement claim will immediately
subject the holder to a declaratory judgment suit, the reduced ability to
get an injunction, and the likelihood of an invalidity claim based on the
obviousness of the patent. All of these factors deter a patent holder from
attempting to victimize competitors through extrajudicial patent enforcement,
which in turn reduces the need for a more expansive declaratory
judgment jurisdiction and tips the desired policy balance enough to
possibly even jeopardize a patent holder’s ability to fairly license a
patent.133
V. PROPOSING A NEW DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TEST
As apparent from the discussion above, the current all circumstances
standard for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases, as applied
in the Federal Circuit, is incongruent with the policy rationale of the
Declaratory Judgment Act. While the standard is safely within Article
III’s constitutional bounds, it does not account for current business realities.
The Declaratory Judgment Act was passed to maintain a balance between
the potential licensee and the patent holder by giving the potential
licensee a weapon to counteract a patent holder’s attempted extra-judicial
enforcement of the holder’s patent.134 This balance is achieved through the

132. Id. at 195–97.
133. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1336 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating “[b]efore declaratory judgment provisions, competitors were
‘victimized’ by patent owners who engaged in ‘extrajudicial patent enforcement . . . .’”).
134. The Declaratory Judgment Act “serves the policies underlying the patent laws
by enabling a test of the validity and infringement of patents that are possibly being used
only as what Learned Hand, in Bresnick v. United States Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239,
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action of two justiciability restraints over declaratory judgment jurisdiction:
constitutional and discretionary considerations.135 The Supreme Court’s
decision in MedImmune and the Federal Circuit’s decision in SanDisk
incorporate the constitutional bounds of declaratory judgment jurisdiction,
but unduly limit the discretionary considerations inherent within the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Declaratory Judgment Act articulates a two step jurisdictional
analysis: First, the court determines whether the lawsuit satisfies an
Article III case or controversy; second, the court weighs the relevant
prudential considerations to determine the appropriateness of exercising
jurisdiction.136 As explained in SanDisk, the first step of this analysis—
the constitutional requirement—is satisfied whenever the declaratory
judgment plaintiff is put in position of “either pursuing arguably illegal
behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.”137 However,
the Federal Circuit stops the jurisdictional analysis here and has all but
eliminated a discretionary element unless there is some other pending
litigation.138
Specifically, the Federal Circuit has limited a trial judge’s discretionary
analysis to the convenience factors associated with 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).139
Under a § 1404(a) analysis, a judge may use his discretion to deny
jurisdiction only in the interests of justice or expediency.140 Unfortunately,

242 (2d Cir. 1943), called ‘scarecrows.’” Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem,
Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
135. “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2000). Declaratory judgment is a negative right. It does not have to be granted
to the full extent as provided by the Constitution, but it may be granted to the full extent.
The constitutional considerations of this Act make sure that jurisdiction stays within the
bounds of Article III, while the discretionary considerations give the courts the ability to
limit jurisdiction when it would be most prudent to do so. Lisa A. Dolak, Power or
Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent Litigants’ Access to the
Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 424–25 (2007).
136. Dolak, supra note 135, at 424.
137. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
138. See Cellco P’ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
139. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The § 1404(a) convenience factors include: a party’s intention to preempt another’s
infringement suit, convenience and availability of the witnesses, the absence of
jurisdiction over all necessary or desirable parties, and the possibility of consolidation
with related litigation. Id.
140. Id.
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this interpretation of the discretionary element in the Declaratory Judgment
Act is too limited because it seeks only to quell forum shopping instead
of narrowing declaratory judgment availability.141 The appropriate
discretionary analysis must account for the party’s business realities and
the existence of two contrary classes of patent holders—patent trolls and
quiescent patent holders.142
This Comment advocates appropriately expanding the discretionary
power granted to district court judges in the Declaratory Judgment Act,
to better refine and narrow declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent
cases. Using discretion, district courts should analyze the appropriateness
of a declaratory judgment on a case-by-case basis, and favor granting
declaratory judgment actions against patent trolls but not quiescent
patent holders. In applying discretionary considerations to a declaratory
judgment suit, this Comment recommends three relevant inquiries a
district court should consider that relate to equity and policy: (A) the
patent holder’s economic function and stance; (B) the immediacy of the
case; and (C) a patent holder’s willingness to negotiate and end the
controversy out of court.
A. Patent Holder’s Economic Function and Stance
The Supreme Court is already beginning to recognize the different
economic functions of a quiescent patent holder and an aggressive patent
owner.143 In EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence recognized the difference between patent trolls and regular
patent owners and even went as far as to say that this recognition should
bear upon the outcome of a case:

141. Id. at 905. “Eventually, robust consideration of these factors will reduce the
incentives for a race to the courthouse because both parties will realize that the case will
be heard or transferred to the most convenient or suitable forum.” Id.
142. The term quiescent patent holder was coined in Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc.
v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In this case, the Federal Circuit
used the term to describe patent holding defendants that do nothing to cause reasonable
apprehension. Id. The court seemed to hint that quiescent status was determined by the
activities or inactivity of the patent holder. Did they actively litigate their patents or
intend to litigate their patents? Id. For the purposes of this Article, a quiescent patent
holder includes good faith licensors who do not act in troll-like behavior. This would
include: inventors, for whom going into the market themselves is simply not
economical or feasible, and thus who instead decide to license; savvy businessmen, who
in good faith are in the business of buying patent properties in order to license them to
others to develop at fair and reasonable prices; and, of course, typical, manufacturing, good
faith licensors.
143. See EBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent
holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed
in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but,
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.144

Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and
Justice Breyer. Thus, four out of five justices already believe that the
nature of the patent being enforced and the patent holder’s present
condition should carry weight in judicial decisionmaking. However,
Justice Roberts’s concurrence in EBay, joined by Justice Scalia and
Justice Ginsberg, acknowledged the precedent of equitable discretion by
the courts, but would limit its reach, and did not expressly recognize a
need to expand discretion to encompass patent trolls.145
In declaratory judgment cases, the only way courts can distinguish
between aggressive patent trolls and quiescent patent holders is through
the application of prudential considerations. One district court decision,
keen on the use of discretion, explained:
The controversy thus becomes ripe for adjudication as soon as the initial threat
of patent litigation is made; but so long as one party reasonably relies on the
forbearance of the other during subsequent negotiations, there may be equitable
and public policy reasons for discretionary dismissal of a declaratory action
when one party unfairly takes advantage of that forbearance to secure a more
convenient forum.146

Although there have as of yet been no cases that deny a declaratory
judgment based solely on the patent holder’s economic function,147 there
have been several district court decisions that evaluated the aggressiveness
of the patent holder’s stance when deciding to exercise declaratory
judgment jurisdiction.148 In Bridgelux, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., Cree was a

144. Id.
145. “[T]here is a difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the
established four-factor test and writing on an entirely clean slate. ‘Discretion is not
whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.’” Id. at 395 (Roberts, J.,
concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005)).
146. Agridyne Techs., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 863 F. Supp. 1522, 1527 n.6 (D.
Utah 1994).
147. The Author performed the following Westlaw search on July 6, 2008: (economic
function or economic stance or economic condition) and declaratory judgment.
148. See, e.g., BridgeLux, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. C 06-6495 PJH, 2007 WL
2022024 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2007); Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., No. 07-3997, 2007 WL
4591957 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2007); Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd.,
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competitor of Bridgelux, and had made statements reflecting the company’s
“intention to defend its technology.”149 However, Cree had never accused
Bridgelux of infringing any of its patents.150 Noting the normalcy of
Cree’s actions and stating that “the same could be said of many patent
holders,” the district court concluded that there was not “sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”151
Similarly, in Prasco, L.L.C. v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp., the
district court looked at prior litigation between the parties to determine
Medicis’s litigation tendencies and whether or not they have a history of
aggressively pushing licensing deals.152 Although there was prior litigation
between the parties, because this litigation involved a different product
and a different patent, the court could not “conclude that the [other]
litigation demonstrates any possibility of future litigation.”153 Likewise,
Medicis had not initiated discussions regarding licensing or made any
statements of infringement; therefore, under the totality of the circumstances,
declaratory judgment jurisdiction was denied.154
This analysis, however, is a double-edged sword and cuts against
patent holders who are recklessly aggressive in asserting their patent
rights.155 In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. 02 Micro International
Ltd., the court acknowledged that 02 Micro had sued numerous parties
including MPS for patent infringement.156 From this evidence, the court
concluded that “such suits indicate an ‘assertion of rights and a willingness
to pursue litigation’ regarding the patent-in-suit.”157 Therefore, the
district court concluded that under all the circumstances, including the
past aggression, there was substantial controversy to satisfy the issuance
of a declaratory judgment.158
These three cases correctly balance the constitutional and prudential
considerations for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent infringement

No. C 07-2363 CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61961 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007); Prasco,
L.L.C. v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., No. 1:06cv313, 2007 WL 1974951 (S.D. Ohio July 3,
2007).
149. BridgeLux, 2007 WL 2022024, at *7.
150. Id. at *9.
151. Id.
152. Prasco, 2007 WL 1974951, at *1.
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. at *3.
155. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1344–45
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that related litigation involving the same technology and the
same parties weighs heavily in favor of establishing a justiciable controversy). See also
Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., No. 07-3997, 2007 WL 4591957 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2007).
156. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd., No. C 07-2363 CW, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61961 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007).
157. Id. at *9–10.
158. Id. at *10.
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cases. Because all three cases came after the Federal Circuit’s decision
in SanDisk, they all abide by SanDisk’s precedent with respect to the
permissible constitutional limits of justiciability.159 However, they
interpret the SanDisk holding in light of the discretionary prudential
concerns inherent within declaratory judgment jurisdiction. These concerns
illustrate a common underlying rationale—namely, that a declaratory
judgment defendant’s prior aggressive action towards the declaratory
judgment plaintiff or other competitors is representative of the defendant’s
willingness and preparedness to file an infringement suit.160 This
rationale is optimal for helping to “police the sometimes subtle line
between cases in which the parties have adverse interests and cases in
which those adverse interests have ripened into a dispute that may
properly be deemed a controversy.”161
B. Immediacy of the Case
A second circumstantial factor that courts should evaluate to
determine the appropriateness of a declaratory judgment suit is the
immediacy of the case. In MedImmune, the Supreme Court held that the
case or controversy must be of “sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”162 This Comment
advocates using prudential circumstances, not limited solely to strict
constitutional lines, to determine the sufficient immediacy of a case or
controversy. The following cases illustrate this approach.
In Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., the Federal Circuit
utilized its discretionary power to withhold declaratory judgment jurisdiction
due to a lack of sufficient immediacy. As previously discussed, Benitec
brought a patent infringement action against Nucleonics who counterclaimed
seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity and unenforceability.163
Following a Supreme Court decision in another case, Benitec withdrew
its claims, covenanted not to sue, and filed a motion to dismiss Nucleonics’s
159. The Federal Circuit found a justiciable controversy in SanDisk because the
patentee’s conduct represented a willingness and preparedness to pursue litigation.
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
160. See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that a history of patent litigation between the parties can provide a
jurisdictional basis).
161. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
162. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
163. Benitec Austl., Ltd., v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008).
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declaratory judgment action.164 Nucleonics argued that although the
current issue may have been moot because of the covenant not to sue,
the company had plans to extend its research, and such an extension
would potentially infringe upon Benitec’s patents.165 The Federal Circuit
held that Nucleonics failed to show that its discussions regarding expansion
into additional products met the immediacy and reality requirement of
MedImmune.166 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk advocated the
application of a pure constitutional standard and admonished the court’s
evaluation of discretionary prudential circumstances in this case.167
Judge Dyk wrote:
While I agree with the majority that the future controversy would not satisfy the
sufficient immediacy and reality test for the filing of a new suit today, Benitec
has made no effort to demonstrate that the controversy between the parties will
not recur. . . . Benitec has not satisfied its burden to eliminate any future controversy
concerning infringement of the ‘099 patent.168

The constitutional considerations in this case involved whether a controversy
still existed, in the sense that Benitec proclaimed a right that conflicted
with the rights Nucleonics proclaimed it had. Judge Dyk correctly stated
that a future controversy of conflicting rights between the two parties
might have credibly existed.
However, the majority was correct in using its discretion to withhold
declaratory judgment jurisdiction over this potential future controversy.
As explained by Judge Bryson, who wrote the SanDisk concurrence,
“[I]t is unrealistic to suggest that some negotiating patentees intend to
enforce their patents while some do not, and that the first group is subject to
declaratory judgment actions while the second is not.”169 Parties in
negotiation and licensing disputes are always going to have potentially
adverse economic and legal relations with respect to patent property
rights.170 The subtle line, however, between adverse legal interests and
ripened adverse legal interests that have turned into a case or controversy is
best determined by the discretion of the district court judge. Additionally,
this use of discretion is appropriately aligned with public policy because
it comports with the essential leeway judges need to withhold ruling on

164. Id. at 1343.
165. Id. at 1348.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
169. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
170. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring); EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 811.
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issues that have a strong potential to be resolved out of court before they
become urgent.171
The district court in Rite Aid Corp. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. invoked
similar discretion. Rite Aid received a letter from Purdue stating its
concern that Rite Aid was selling infringing generic versions of Purdue’s
patented OxyContin.172 Rite Aid continued to sell the alleged infringing
generic version of OxyContin and filed a declaratory judgment against
Purdue seeking invalidity of Purdue’s OxyContin patents.173 Despite
constitutional justification for declaratory judgment jurisdiction in this
dispute, prudential considerations deterred the court from exercising declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. No actual controversy existed between Purdue
and Rite Aid because companies similarly situated to Rite Aid settled
with Purdue, rendering the potential infringement too remote. The court
explained that “[b]ecause the settlements in Endo, Teva, and Impax have
removed all unauthorized generic OxyContin from the market and
released third-party re-sellers from patent-infringement liability, there is
no ‘actual controversy’ . . . .”174 Rite Aid argued that these settlements
did not unequivocally bar Purdue from filing a patent infringement suit
because there existed certain clauses in the settlements, which, if
satisfied, would expose Rite Aid to patent infringement liability.175 The
court concluded, however, that because these clauses were too remote in
time and only a mere possibility, the dispute lacked sufficient immediacy to

171. See Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the patentee’s attempt to conduct license negotiations was
a commercial activity that generally does not turn into a litigation controversy until
negotiations have broken down). Also, district court judges are in the best position to
determine if the patentee’s negotiation tactics are merely a pretext designed to avoid a
declaratory judgment suit or if the declaratory judgment suit was a pretext for more
negotiation leverage. An example of this can be seen in the Federal Circuit’s EMC case:
The day after the [declaratory judgment] complaint was filed, EMC’s senior
intellectual property counsel called Norand’s outside patent counsel and
explained that the declaratory judgment complaint had been filed as ‘merely a
defensive step’ . . . . Under these circumstances, the district court could properly
view the declaratory judgment complaint as a tactical measure filed in order to
improve EMC’s posture in the ongoing negotiations—not a purpose that the
Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to serve.
EMC Corp., 89 F.3d at 815.
172. Rite Aid Corp. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 06 Civ. 15304, 2007 WL 2388912,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2007).
173. Id. at *2.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id. at *4.
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constitute an actual controversy.176 This decision conveys an important
underlying message: Even if a genuine dispute exists, as here regarding
the rights to sell generic OxyContin, the court will favor negotiation and
settlement over the admission of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
C. Patent Holder’s Willingness to Negotiate Outside of Court
This leads to the third factor judges should consider when evaluating
declaratory judgment jurisdiction—the parties’ willingness to negotiate
and settle. Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit generally deemed the
patent holder’s willingness to engage in negotiation as negating any
reasonable apprehension of suit, even in the absence of a covenant not to
sue.177 Likewise, the Federal Circuit also found ongoing negotiations to
lessen the need for judicial relief.178 Encouraging negotiation over
judicial remedies conforms with public policy because negotiations are
more practical and commercially efficient.179 Additionally, negotiations
promote the judicial efficiency that Congress sought in the Declaratory
176. Id. at *5. The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in CAT Tech L.L.C. v.
Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008), reinforces the soundness of this
judgment. In this case, the court stressed the dispositive nature that immediacy of a case
has upon declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Id. at 880. The court explained, “the greater
the length of time before potentially infringing activity is expected to occur, ‘the more
likely the case lacks the requisite immediacy.’” Id. at 881.
177. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court
explained:
Amoco took no action against Shell; it made no assertive contact concerning the
patent; it issued no threats. Shell, in an exercise of prudent good business
citizenship, approached Amoco, stating that it intended to embark on a course of
conduct, recognizing, but disagreeing, that Amoco’s patent might be considered
to dominate its work. Rather than wait to be caught in a possibly infringing posture, it
identified its proposed activity to Amoco and sought either confirmation of its
views or a license. Such conduct is praiseworthy.
Id. Prior to SanDisk, federal courts have, at a minimum, considered settlement negotiations a
relevant, but not dispositive, factor in determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction. See
Elec. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Genender Intern, Inc. v. Skagen Designs, Ltd., No. 07 C 5993, 2008 WL 2521894, at *3
(N.D. Ill. April 14, 2008) (providing a brief overview of current case law regarding the
effect of settlement negotiations on declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
178. The Federal Circuit noted that:
While a court may conclude that ongoing negotiations do not negate the
presence of a controversy for jurisdictional purposes, the court may nonetheless
find, in deciding whether to hear the declaratory judgment action, that the need
for judicial relief is not as compelling as in cases in which there is no real
prospect of non-judicial resolution of the dispute.
EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
179. “[T]he practical effect of denying access to the courts is the concern of the
Declaratory Judgment Act . . . . When there are proposed or ongoing license negotiations, a
litigation controversy normally does not arise until the negotiations have broken down.”
Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
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Judgment Act.180 Unfortunately, contrary to the goals in the Declaratory
Judgment Act, in Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies,
Ltd., the Federal Circuit directly overruled a district court’s declaratory
judgment dismissal that was grounded in prudential concerns.181 The
district court had properly considered the suit a mere intimidation tactic
by the declaratory judgment plaintiff to gain leverage in licensing
negotiations.182 Citing insufficient evidence, the Federal Circuit did not
directly hold that this type of discretionary dismissal is never allowed.183
Since SanDisk, there has been only one federal court holding denying
declaratory judgment jurisdiction based upon a plaintiff’s shrewd litigation
tactics.184 In Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,185 the
district judge utilized his discretion to deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction
despite an alleged affirmative act that likely created an Article III case or
controversy as understood under the MedImmune standard.186 The
district judge reasoned that the declaratory judgment plaintiff’s sly prelitigation behavior and unwillingness to “make its concerns a matter of
record pre-suit” spoiled the objectives behind the Declaratory Judgment
Act.187 The use of discretion in this case exemplifies, albeit in a narrow
paradigm, the appropriate reasoning process judges should follow when
deciding whether to use their discretion to deny declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.
In sum, this Comment proposes a new test that encourages judges to
review declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases more strictly, by
180. Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory
Judgment Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 255 (2004).
If a court dismisses a declaratory action merely because an affirmative lawsuit
is subsequently filed, the court negates the purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act. . . . In addition, unbridled application of the anticipatory lawsuit
exception gives unfair leverage to the putative plaintiff in negotiations, allowing the
plaintiff to keep a cloud over the defendant’s business and future plans.
Id.
181. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1289.
184. The Author performed the following Westlaw search on July 6, 2008:
negotiate! and dismiss /s declaratory judgment and patent and da(aft 12/31/2006).
185. Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 07-589-SLR/LPS, 2008
WL 4809104 (D. Del. Nov 5, 2008).
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id. The declaratory judgment plaintiff’s sly behavior includes “initiating
telephone conversations to employees of the patentee who were not in decision-making
positions and who were not informed of the real purpose behind the conversations.” Id.
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evaluating three major prudential considerations. First, judges should
evaluate the declaratory judgment defendant’s economic function and
position. If the declaratory judgment defendant is a quiescent patent
holder, then judges should be less willing to grant a declaratory judgment
against such defendants. Second, judges should continue to require that
a case or controversy be of sufficient immediacy and reality. Judges
should not follow Judge Dyk’s overly broad interpretation of a possible
future controversy, but instead should analyze only the controversies set
forth in the facts alleged. If a controversy is too far and distant, then
judges should deny declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Third, judges
should be more sympathetic to declaratory judgment defendants who
are actively willing to negotiate. If negotiations are in progress and a
declaratory judgment is filed in an effort to gain more negotiating leverage,
then judges should use their discretionary power to deny jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
When determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction, district court
judges should exercise their discretion by considering three factors: the
patent holder’s economic function and stance, the immediacy of the case,
and the patent holder’s willingness to negotiate. These three factors would
best serve the public policy espoused in the Declaratory Judgment Act
by restoring the balance that the MedImmune and SanDisk decisions
upset between patent holders and their potential licensees. As a result,
parties would be encouraged to negotiate a licensing dispute out of court,
and declaratory judgment jurisdiction would be limited to the patent
cases it was originally intended to resolve. In other words, the pink elephant
would disappear, and opposing parties would return to the negotiation
table seeing eye to eye.
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